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Secure Directional Modulation to Enhance Physical
Layer Security in IoT Networks
Feng Shu, Siming Wan, Shihao Yan, Qian Wang, Yongpeng Wu, Riqing Chen, Jun Li, and Jinhui Lu
Abstract—In this work, an adaptive and robust null-space
projection (AR-NSP) scheme is proposed for secure transmission
with artificial noise (AN)-aided directional modulation (DM) in
wireless networks. The proposed scheme is carried out in three
steps. Firstly, the directions of arrival (DOAs) of the signals
from the desired user and eavesdropper are estimated by the
Root Multiple Signal Classificaiton (Root-MUSIC) algorithm and
the related signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) are estimated based
on the ratio of the corresponding eigenvalue to the minimum
eigenvalue of the covariance matrix of the received signals. In
the second step, the value intervals of DOA estimation errors
are predicted based on the DOA and SNR estimations. Finally,
a robust NSP beamforming DM system is designed according to
the afore-obtained estimations and predictions. Our examination
shows that the proposed scheme can significantly outperform the
conventional non-adaptive robust scheme and non-robust NSP
scheme in terms of achieving a much lower bit error rate (BER)
at the desired user and a much higher secrecy rate (SR). In
addition, the BER and SR performance gains achieved by the
proposed scheme relative to other schemes increase with the value
range of DOA estimation error.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, privacy and security,
internet of things (IoT), artificial noise, directional modulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless mediums, private
information is vulnerable to be intercepted by unintended
users, which causes ever-increasing concerns on the security
of wireless networks. As such, transmission, storage, process-
ing, and protection of confidential information in wireless
networks are of growing research interests [1]–[4]. Against
this background,, there is an increasing demand for designing
secure transmissions to protect the legitimate users against
being overheard [5]–[18]. In [5], Wyner conducted pioneering
research on a discrete memoryless wiretap channel for secure
communication in the presence of an eavesdropper and pro-
posed the notion of secrecy capacity. Different from the con-
ventional cryptographic technologies, of which the achieved
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security is based on the high computational complexity, phys-
ical layer security (PLS) can be utilized to provide an ever-
lasting information-theoretic security. In addition, PLS does
not require cryptographic keys in order to achieve secrecy,
which eliminate the complicated key distributions and manage-
ments. Consequently, it is essential to take advantage of PLS
to defend unintended user against eavesdropping confidential
information in the upcoming fifth generation (5G) and beyond
wireless networks [8].
A secure transmission scheme was proposed, using the basic
idea of original symbol phase rotated (OSPR) in [9], to ran-
domly rotate the phase of original symbols at base station (BS)
before they are transmitted, so that the legitimate receivers
were able to successfully recover original symbols by taking
proper inverse operation while the illegitimate users could not
detect most of original symbols. Artificial noise (AN)-aided
security transmission was employed in [10]–[14] to disrupt
the unauthorized users from tapping the confidential messages.
In [10], provided that the channel state information (CSI)
was publicly and perfectly known, the transmitter produced
AN to guarantee secure communication in two scenarios,
the transmitter equipped with multiple antennas and multiple-
cooperative-relays-aided secure transmission. Cooperative re-
lays and symbol-level precoding were respectively considered
in [15]–[17] and [18] to enhance PLS and prevent eaves-
dropping attacks in wireless networks. Moreover, security and
privacy is critical in the field of internet of things (IoT),
and PLS plays a key role in IoT networks [19]–[23]. The
author in [20] summarized the low-complexity PLS schemes
for IoT and presented some new research topics in the context
of future IoT. In [21], randomize-and-forward relay strategy
was leveraged for secure relay communication without the
knowledge of number and locations of eavesdroppers in IoT.
And all devices equipped with single antenna and multiple
antennas were analyzed, respectively. To enhance the PLS,
the authors in [22] investigated secure downlink transmission
with the help of cooperative jamming in the IoT networks.
Additionally, wireless physical layer identification (WPLI)
system was proposed in [23] to increase the user capacity by
assigning multiple devices to one user in IoT networks.
Directional modulation (DM), as a critical secure wireless
technique, attracts tremendous research interests from both
academia and industry and plays an increasingly important
role in the context of PLS of wireless communications and
networks. An orthogonal vector approach, using the concept
of null-space projection (NSP), was proposed in [24] to
allow analysis and synthesis of DM transmitter arrays. In
[25], an AN-aided zero-forcing method was proposed, which
2was intimately related to the concept of pseudo-inverse of
matrix, where the dynamic characteristic of DM was achieved
by randomly changing the AN vector at the symbol-level
rate. However, it was assumed that the perfect knowledge of
the desired direction was available. Additionally, maximizing
the so-called signal-to-leakage-and-noise ratio (SLNR) for all
users simultaneously to design precoders was proposed in
[26], [27]. In [28]–[30], the direction angle estimation error
was taken into account and a robust method of designing the
beamforming vector of confidential information and projection
matrix of AN was presented. The authors of [28] derived
a closed-form expression for the null space of conjugate
transpose of the steering vector in the desired direction and
proposed a robust DM synthesis method based on conditional
minimum mean square error (MMSE) criterion. In [29], the
authors extended the idea in [28] to the broadcasting sce-
nario, where the conditional leakage beamforming scheme
was presented. In [30], without the knowledge of direction
measurement error, a blind robust secure leakage method of
using main-lobe-integration was constructed for multi-user
multiple input multiple output (MIMO) scenario. Furthermore,
the authors extended the application of DM to a multi-cast
scenario in [31]. In this work, two methods, maximum group
receive power plus null-space projection scheme and Max-
SLNR plus maximum-AN-leakage-and-noise ratio scheme,
were proposed to enhance PLS and improve the secrecy sum-
rate compared with block diagonalization using the same order
low computational complexity.
All the aforementioned research works on DM only focus
on how to design beamforming schemes with perfect infor-
mation of the direction angle or imperfect such information
but with given error distributions. We note that it is hard,
if not impossible, to adapt the DM techniques proposed in
the aforementioned works as per different channel conditions,
such as the varying signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Actually, in
all the robust DM beamforming schemes, the first step is to
estimate the direction-of-arrival (DOA) together with the SNR
and predict the value range of DOA estimation error at DM
transmitter, which is mandatory in a practical DM network.
However, this step is overlooked in the context of designing
robust synthesis methods of DM in the literature. In addition,
due to the randomness of wireless channels, the transmitter
may have to estimate the DOA and SNR periodically. To
address the estimation problem in DM networks, in this work
we propose an adaptive and robust NSP (AR-NSP) method,
which consists of three steps. Firstly, the DOAs are measured
by Root Multiple Signal Classificaiton (Root-MUSIC) rule
and the corresponding SNRs are estimated. Then the value
ranges of the DOA estimation error are predicted. In the
last step, a robust NSP scheme is proposed to design the
beamforming vector of confidential information and the AN
projection vector without the statistical knowledge of channel
noise. Our main contributions are summarized as below.
1) Based on the singular value decomposition (SVD) of the
covariance matrix of the receive signals achieved by the
Root-MUSIC method, we first estimate the receive SNRs
for the desired and eavesdropping users. These estimated
SNRs are further utilized to predict the value intervals
of DOA estimation errors with the aid of the Cramer-
Rao lower bound (CRLB) expression of unbiased DOA
estimators.
2) As per the predicted value intervals of DOA estimation
errors, we propose an AR-NSP scheme for DM, aiming
to enhance the secure transmission of confidential infor-
mation. The proposed method can adapt its beamforming
vector of the confidential information and the projection
vector of AN according to the quality of wireless chan-
nels. Our examine shows that the proposed method can
achieve noticeable performance gains relative to the non-
adaptive robust conditional MMSE method presented in
[28] and the non-robust NSP method proposed in [24]
in terms of achieving a much lower bit error rate (BER)
and a significantly higher security rate (SR).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the DM system model. In Section III, DOA and
SNR are first estimated and then the value intervals of DOA
estimation errors are predicted. In addition, our proposed
AR-NSP scheme is detailed in this section. Simulation and
numerical results are presented in Section IV. Finally, we draw
our conclusions in Section V.
Notations: Throughout the paper, matrices, vectors, and
scalars are denoted by letters of bold upper case, bold lower
case, and lower case, respectively. Signs (·)T , (·)H , and ‖ · ‖
represent transpose, conjugate transpose, and norm, respec-
tively. The notation E{·} denotes the expectation operation.
IN denotes the N ×N identity matrix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model of interest is shown in Fig. 1, where
Alice is a transceiver equipped with an N -antenna array, while
each of Bob and Eve is equipped with a single antenna. The
secure transmission in the considered system model incurs in
two consecutive time slots. In the first time slot, Bob and
Eve transmit signals, while Alice receives their signals. Alice
measures Bob’s and Eve’s directions and predicts their value
intervals of the direction measurement errors. In the second
time slot, Alice uses the predicted directions and error value
intervals to design the AR-NSP scheme. Subsequently, Alice
transmits the confidential information to Bob using the AR-
NSP scheme in order to prevent Eve from eavesdropping the
confidential information successfully.
A. System Model in the First Time Slot
In the first time slot, Bob and Eve are the transmitters,
while Alice is the receiver. In fact, Bob transmits useful
signals to Alice, while Eve is an active attacker who would
like to intercept the communications between Alice and Bob.
By receiving the transmitted signals from Bob and Eve,
Alice can measure their directions. Bob and Eve send the
passband signals sb(t)e
j2pifbt and se(t)e
j2pifet, respectively,
where sb(t), and se(t) represent their corresponding baseband
signals, and fb and fe are carrier frequencies, respectively.
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Fig. 1. System model of adaptive and robust directional modulation.
With the narrow-band assumption, the receive signal at Alice
can be expressed as
r(t) = sb(t)a(θb) + se(t)a(θe) + n(t), (1)
where a(θb) and a(θe) are the array manifolds for Bob and
Eve defined by
a(θb) =
[
1, e
j 2pi
λb
d sin(θb), · · · , ej 2piλb (N−1)d sin(θb)
]T
, (2)
and
a(θe) =
[
1, ej
2pi
λe
d sin(θe), · · · , ej 2piλe (N−1)d sin(θe)
]T
, (3)
respectively, and d denotes the spacing between two adjacent
elements, while λb = c/fb and λe = c/fe are the wavelengths
of the transmit signal carriers from Bob and Eve, respectively.
After down-conversion and A/D operations, the resultant
sampled receive baseband signal can be represented as
r[k] = sb[k]a(θb) + se[k]a(θe) + n[k], k = 1, 2, · · ·Ns, (4)
where Ns is the number of snapshots, Pb = E{| sb[k] |2}
and Pe = E{| se[k] |2} are the transmit powers of Bob and
Eve, and n[k] is the receiving noise vector with distribution
CN (0, σˆ2IN ).
B. System Model in the Second Time Slot
Given that Alice has estimated the direction angles of Bob
and Eve in the first time slot, she transmits its confidential
messages by the precoding vector vb towards Bob, and pre-
vents Eve from intercepting Alice’s confidential messages by
using AN projection vector we in the second time slot. The
transmit signal of Alice is given by
sm = β1
√
Psvbxm + β2
√
Pswezm, (5)
where Ps is the total transmission power of Alice, β1 and
β2 are the power allocation (PA) coefficients of confidential
messages and AN with β21 + β
2
2 = 1, respectively, vb ∈
CN×1denotes the transmitting beamforming vector of useful
signals for forcing the confidential messages to the desired
direction and we ∈ CN×1 is the AN projection vector of
leading AN to the undesired direction, xm is the confidential
message with E
{
xHmxm
}
= 1, and zm denotes the scalar AN
varying from one symbol to another with E
{
zHmzm
}
= 1.
We suppose that sm passes through the line-of-sight (LOS)
channel and then the receive signal at direction θ is given by
y(θ) = hH(θ)sm + nr
= β1
√
Psh
H(θ)vbxm + β2
√
Psh
H(θ)wezm + nr,
(6)
where θ is the direction angle between transmitter and re-
ceiver and θ ∈ [−pi/2, pi/2], nr is additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) of obeying the complex Gaussian distribution
CN (0, σ2r), h(θ) ∈ CN×1 is the array manifold given by
h(θ) =
1√
N
[
ej2piΨθ(1), · · · , ej2piΨθ(n), · · · , ej2piΨθ(N)
]T
(7)
and the phase function Ψθ(n) along direction θ can be written
as
Ψθ(n) , − (n− (N + 1)/2)d cos θ
λ
, n = 1, 2, · · ·N. (8)
As such, the receive signals at Bob and Eve can be expressed
as
y(θb) = h
H(θb)sm + nb
= β1
√
Psh
H(θb)vbxm + β2
√
Psh
H(θb)wezm + nb,
(9)
and
y(θe) = h
H(θe)sm + ne
= β1
√
Psh
H(θe)vbxm + β2
√
Psh
H(θe)wezm + ne,
(10)
respectively, where nb ∼ CN (0, σ2b ) and ne ∼ CN (0, σ2e)
represent the AWGN at Bob and Eve, respectively. Without
loss of generality, we assume that σ2r = σ
2
b = σ
2
e = σ
2.
Following (9) and (10), we have the achievable rates at Bob
and Eve as
R(θb) , I(y(θb); [x, θb])
= log2
(
1 +
β21Psh
H(θb)vbv
H
b h(θb)
σ2b + β
2
2Psh
H(θb)wewHe h(θb)
)
(11)
4and
R(θe) , I(y(θe); [x, θe])
= log2
(
1 +
β21Psh
H(θe)vbv
H
b h(θe)
σ2e + β
2
2Psh
H(θe)wewHe h(θe)
)
, (12)
which yield the achievable secrecy rate Rs as
Rs = max {0, R(θb)−R(θe)} . (13)
III. PROPOSED ADAPTIVE AND ROBUST NSP SCHEME
In this section, we present the proposed AR-NSP scheme
to design the beamforming vector vb and projection vector
we. Firstly, the direction angles, including the directions of
desired user and eavesdropper, and the corresponding SNRs
are estimated using the Root-MUSIC algorithm. Subsequently,
based on the estimated angles and SNRs, the value intervals
of the DOA estimation errors are predicted with the aid of
CRLB. Finally, the AR-NSP scheme is constructed to enhance
the secrecy performance of the considered DM system.
A. DOA and SNR Estimations with Error Range Prediction
In the first time slot, by collecting the receive vector r[k]
of Ns snapshots for ∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Ns}, the covariance
matrix of r[k] in (4) is given by
Ryy =
1
Ns
Ns∑
k=1
r[k]rH [k]
=
1
Ns
Ns∑
k=1
{Pba(θb)aH(θb) + Pea(θe)aH(θe)}
+
1
Ns
Ns∑
k=1
σˆ2IN . (14)
As per the SVD operation,Ryy can be reformulated as follows
Ryy = UΛU
H + σˆ2IN
= UΠUH , (15)
where U is an unitary matrix, and Π is a diagonal matrix
given by
Π = diag(NPb + σˆ
2, NPe + σˆ
2, σˆ2, · · · , σˆ2). (16)
Referring to the Root-MUSIC in [32], the estimated value
of direction angle θˆm can be computed as per the following
expression
θˆm = arcsin
(
arg(zm)
ld
)
,m ∈ {1, 2}, (17)
where
l =
2pi
λ
, (18)
and m = 1 means θ1 = θb, i.e., the desired direction, m = 2
means that θ2 = θe, the eavesdropper direction, and zm are the
two roots of the polynomial of the Root-MUSIC in [32], which
are the two solutions closet to the unit circle inside the unit
circle. By performing the SVD operation on the covariance
matrix Ryy, we can obtain the signal subspace ES , the noise
subspace EN , and the associated eigenvalues in descending
order, i.e,
µ1 > µ2 > · · · > µM+1 > · · · > µN , (19)
where M = 2 is the number of incoming signals. Then the
noise variance is given by
σˆ2 =
µM+1 + · · ·+ µN
N −M , (20)
which yields the SNR estimated value for emission source m
as
γˆm =
µm − σˆ2
Nσˆ2
, (21)
which can be used to predict the intervals of the DOA
estimation errors. From the definition of CRLB, we have the
variance of direction angle error is lower bounded by [33]
σ2θm ≥ CRLBm ≈
λ2
8pi2Nsγˆm cos2 θˆmL
, (22)
where
L =
N∑
n=1
d2n, (23)
and
dn = (n− N + 1
2
)d, n = 1, 2, · · ·N. (24)
Since we can get the lower bound of standard deviation σθm ,
the approximated value interval of DOA estimation error is
given by
θm ∈
[
θˆm −∆θˆm,max, θˆm +∆θˆm,max
]
(25)
where
∆θˆm,max = ρ σθm ≈ ρ
√
(CRLBm). (26)
By increasing the value of ρ in (26), the probability that (25)
holds tends to one. We note that here we adopt ρ = 1 and
in the numerical section we examine the impact of ρ on the
secrecy performance of the proposed AR-NSP scheme.
B. Design of the AR-NSP Scheme
In (17), the estimated direction angle can be expanded as
θˆm = θm +∆θm, (27)
where θm is the ideal direction angle, and ∆θm stands for
the angle error. Combining (25) and the above expression, we
have
∆θm ∈
[
−∆θˆm,max, ∆θˆm,max
]
. (28)
Additionally, for convenience of deriving below, the probabil-
ity density function (PDF) of angle error is approximated to
be a uniform distribution given by
p (∆θm) =


1
2∆θm
, −∆θˆm,max ≤ ∆θm ≤ ∆θˆm,max,
0, otherwise,
(29)
where ∆θˆm,max denotes the interval of DOA estimation error.
Given the estimated direction angles θˆb and θˆe, in accor-
dance with [17] and [34], we have the conditional expectation
5of robust beamforming vector of the confidential information
and the AN projection vector as
E[v¯b | θˆb, θˆe] = E[(IN − h(θe)hH(θe))h(θb) | θˆb, θˆe]
= (IN −Re)ub, (30)
and
E[w¯e | θˆb, θˆe] = E[(IN − h(θb)hH(θb))h(θe) | θˆb, θˆe]
= (IN −Rb)ue, (31)
respectively, where we define
Rb , E[h(θb)h
H(θb) | θˆb]
Re , E[h(θe)h
H(θe) | θˆe]
ub , E[h(θb) | θˆb]
ue , E[h(θe) | θˆe], (32)
and the corresponding normalized beamforming vector vb and
projection vector we can be written as
vb =
E[v¯b | θˆb, θˆe]
‖ E[v¯b | θˆb, θˆe] ‖
, (33)
and
we =
E[w¯e | θˆb, θˆe]
‖ E[w¯e | θˆb, θˆe] ‖
. (34)
Since the estimated direction angles and their intervals of DOA
estimation errors are known, the derivation of p-th row and q-
th column entry of matrix Re is given by
Re(p, q) = E[hp(θˆe −∆θe)hHq (θˆe −∆θe)]
=
1
N
∫ ∆θˆe,max
−∆θˆe,max
ejpi(q−p) cos(θˆe−∆θe)
× p (∆θe) d(∆θe). (35)
In order to simplify the presentation of (35), we define
apq = jpi(q − p) cos(θˆe), (36)
bpq = jpi(q − p) sin(θˆe), (37)
and define a new variable as
xe =
∆θe
ce
, (38)
where
ce = ∆θˆe,max pi
−1. (39)
Using the above definition, (35) can be reformulated as
Re(p, q) =
1
2piN
∫ pi
−pi
eapq cos(cexe)+bpq sin(cexe)dxe
=
1
N
gI(apq, bpq, ce), (40)
where
gI(apq, bpq, ce) =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
eapq cos(cexe)+bpq sin(cexe)dxe.
(41)
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Fig. 2. Block diagram of the proposed AR-NSP scheme.
Likewise, we can derive the n-th element of vector ub as
ub(n) = E[hn(θˆb −∆θb)]
=
1√
N
∫ ∆θˆb,max
−∆θˆb,max
e−jpi(n−
N+1
2
) cos(θˆb−∆θb)
× p(∆θb)d(∆θb)
=
1
2pi
√
N
∫ pi
−pi
een cos(cbxb)+fn sin(cbxb)dxb
=
1√
N
gI(en, fn, cb), (42)
where
en = −jpi(n− N + 1
2
) cos(θˆb), (43)
fn = −jpi(n− N + 1
2
) sin(θˆb), (44)
xb =
∆θb
cb
, (45)
cb = ∆θˆb,max pi
−1. (46)
Thus, the corresponding entry of matrix Rb and vector ue can
be computed in the same manner.
Taking the above two subsections into account, Fig. 2
presents the flow chart for the proposed AR-NSP scheme. At
the same time, we also summarize the detailed operational
procedures of our proposed AR-NSP scheme in Algorithm 1.
6Algorithm 1 Proposed AR-NSP algorithm
1) Firstly, Bob and Eve act as transmitters and Al-
ice (as the receiver) measures the Bob/desired and
Eve/eavesdropper direction angles via Root-MUSIC.
2) The receive SNR values for Bob and Eve at Alice are
estimated using the singular value ratio of SVD in Root-
MUSIC.
3) Using CRLBm on the basis of estimated direction
angle θˆm and estimated SNR γˆm, the intervals of DOA
estimation errors are approximately predicted.
4) The probability density functions of angle errors are
approximated as uniform distributions over the predicted
value ranges.
5) Finally, Alice (as the transmitter) adopts the proposed
AR-NSP beamforming method, to design the beamform-
ing vector vb of confidential messages and projection
vector we of AN based on the results from Step 1) to
Step 4), and transmits confidential information to Bob.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically examine the secrecy perfor-
mance of the proposed adaptive and robust NSP scheme. With-
out other statements, the adopted system parameters are set as
follows: quadrature phase shift keying(QPSK) modulation is
adopted, the spacing between two adjacent antennas is set as
d = λ/2, the total transmitting power is set as Ps = 30dBm,
PA factors are set as β21 = 0.9 and β
2
2 = 0.1, the actual desired
direction is set as θb = 45
◦, and the actual eavesdropping
direction is set as θe = −30◦.
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In Fig. 3, we plot the estimated SNR versus the exact SNR
with different numbers of antennas at Alice. In this figure,
we first observe that the estimated SNR becomes closer to
the exact SNR as the number of antennas increases. We also
observe that the estimated SNR slightly deviates from the exact
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Fig. 5. Root mean squared error of the estimation of θ versus exact SNR
with different numbers of antennas.
SNR when the exact SNR is less than 0dB and this deviation
increases as the exact SNR decreases. However, as we can see
from this figure, the estimated SNR is almost the same as the
exact SNR when SNR is higher than 0dB. This means that
the proposed SNR estimator can be viewed as an unbiased
estimator when the exact SNR is relatively high.
In Fig. 4, we plot the root mean squared error (RMSE)
of the SNR estimation versus the exact SNR with different
values of N . In this figure, we first observe that the RMSE
monotonously decreases with the exact SNR. In addition,
we observe that as the number of antennas at Alice (i.e.,
the value of N ) increases, the RMSE decreases. These two
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Fig. 7. BER of three different schemes versus the value interval of DOA
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observations indicate that the estimation accuracy of the SNR
can be improved by increasing the number of receive antennas
at Alice or increasing the transmit power.
In order to examine the accuracy of the estimated angle
achieved by Root-MUSIC, in Fig. 5 we plot the RMSE of the
estimation of θ versus the exact SNR with different numbers
of antennas at Alice, while the corresponding CRLB is also
presented as a benchmark. In this figure, we first observe
that as the exact SNR increases, both the RMSE and CRLB
monotonously decrease and the RMSE becomes closer to
the CRLB. This demonstrates that the performance of ROOT
MUSIC DOA estimation is better in the high SNR regimes
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Fig. 8. SR of three different schemes versus the value interval of DOA
estimation errors (SNR=10dB, N=16).
than in the low SNR regimes. In addition, in this figure we
observe that both the RMSE and CRLB decreases as the
number of antennas at Alice increases, which shows that the
direction angle estimation is more accurate when the numbers
of antennas becomes larger. Furthermore, from this figure we
can see that the RMSE is almost the same as the CRLB when
the exact SNR is higher than 0dB. This means that the Root-
MUSIC is a consistent estimator of direction angle. Finally, in
this figure we observe that the RMSE converges to the CRLB
more rapidly as the exact SNR increases when the number of
antennas at Alice is larger.
In Fig. 6, we plot the BER (i.e., bit error rate) achieved
by the proposed AR-NSP scheme versus different values of ρ
with different SNRs in order to examine the impact of different
values of ρ on the secrecy performance of the proposed AR-
NSP scheme. In this figure, we first observe that the BER of
the proposed scheme is indeed a function of ρ and there is
an optimal value of ρ that minimizes the corresponding BER.
Surprisingly, under the specific system settings we observe that
ρ = 1 achieves the minimum BER, which is the reason that
we adopt ρ = 1 in the proposed AR-NSP scheme. In addition,
we observe that the BER is more sensitive to the values of ρ
when ρ > 1 relative to when ρ ≤ 1. As such, without enough
information or resource to determining the optimal value of ρ,
it is reasonable to set ρ ≤ 1 in order to reduce the impact of ρ
on the secrecy performance of the proposed AR-NSP scheme.
In Fig. 7, we examine the BER performance of the pro-
posed AR-NSP scheme, with the non-adaptive robust scheme
proposed in [28] and the non-robust NSP scheme proposed
in [24] as benchmarks. Specifically, in Fig. 7 we plot the
BER of the three schemes versus the value interval of DOA
estimation errors with SNR=10dB and N=16. In this figure, we
observe that the BER of the proposed scheme is much lower
than that of the other benchmark schemes. In general, the
8(a) Phase versus direction angle of non-robust NSP scheme
(b) Phase versus direction angle of non-adaptive robust scheme
(c) Phase versus direction angle of proposed AR-NSP scheme
Fig. 9. Eye patterns of three different schemes when the value interval of
DOA estimation errors is 4 degree.
BER performance gap becomes more dominant as the value
interval of DOA estimation errors increases. This demonstrates
the superiority of the proposed scheme over the other two
schemes. Furthermore, as expected we observe that the BER
of the three schemes increases with the value interval of DOA
estimation errors.
In Fig. 8, we show the SR (i.e., secrecy rate) of the proposed
AR-NSP scheme versus the value interval of DOA estimation
errors, again with the non-adaptive robust scheme proposed
in [28] and the non-robust NSP scheme proposed in [24] as
benchmarks. In this figure, we first observe that the SRs of
the three schemes decrease as the interval of DOA estimation
errors increases. This is due to the fact that the probability of
the estimated direction angle deviating from the exact direction
angle becomes larger as the interval of DOA estimation errors
becomes larger. In addition, we observe that the proposed AR-
NSP scheme outperforms the other two schemes in terms of
achieving a much higher SR. Furthermore, in this figure we
observe that the SR performance gap between the proposed
scheme and the other two schemes increases as the interval of
DOA estimation errors increases. This can be explained by the
fact that the beamforming vector of confidential information
and projection vector of AN in the proposed AR-NSP scheme
are averaged over different channel conditions, while they are
set without considering different channel conditions in the
other two schemes.
In order to examine the phase of signal constellation versus
direction angle (namely eye patten) of the proposed AR-NSP
scheme. Fig. 9 presents the eye patterns of 1000 random
QPSK symbols of the proposed AR-NSP scheme, the non-
adaptive robust scheme proposed in [28], and the non-robust
NSP scheme proposed in [24], where the interval of DOA
estimation errors is 4 degree. From the three subfigures, we can
see that the eye pattern of the proposed scheme in subfigure
(c) opens larger and cleaner than those of the other two
schemes presented in subfigure (a) and (b). This means that
the proposed method can reduce the effect of AN along the
desired direction and push more AN towards the eavesdropper
direction. This is the main reason that our proposed AR-NSP
scheme can significantly outperform the other two schemes.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed the AR-NSP scheme to en-
hance PLS of DM systems in wireless networks. In the
proposed scheme, the DOAs and SNRs of the desired user
and eavesdropper are firstly estimated, based on which the
value intervals of DOA estimation errors are predicted. Then,
the beamforming vector of the confidential information and
the AN projection vector are designed as per these estimated
DOAs/SNRs and the predicted error intervals. Our examina-
tion shows that the proposed AR-NSP scheme can significantly
outperform two benchmark schemes in terms of achieving a
lower BER and a higher SR. In the context of DM systems,
the proposed scheme eliminates the impractical assumption of
applying PLS, which is that the exact or estimated locations
of the desired user and eavesdropper are a priori available. As
such, the proposed scheme can potentially achieve the ever-
9lasting information-theoretic security in some practical scenar-
ios, such as IoT, future mobile communications, satellite com-
munications, device-to-device, vehicle-to-vehicle, millimeter-
wave communications, smart transportation, and unmanned-
aerial-vehicles networks.
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